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During the last ten years or so, there has been a noticeable surge of interest in
disjunctivism, accompanied by the emergence of many different promising disjunctivist
positions on a large variety of philosophical issues. However, this positive development
has yet to lead to a change in the general attitude towards disjunctivism, which is often
one of prevailing scepticism or even disregard. It is still not rare to dismiss disjunctivism
right from the start as too implausible or abstruse to be considered as a serious alternative
to other views. Not surprisingly, disjunctivism has so far failed to gain the level of
attention in contemporary philosophical discussions that it deserves, and which many of
its rival positions already enjoy.
Part of the reason for this state of the debate is perhaps that proponents and opponents
of disjunctivism alike have not always been sufficiently careful in distinguishing the
various forms of disjunctivism, nor in determining their precise commitments. This
excellent and timely volume—together with the slightly later published collection of
classical texts on disjunctivism edited by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (2009)—is bound
to remedy this situation and to improve the wider understanding of both the content and
the significance of disjunctivist positions. Indeed, the essays concerned show that any
serious attempt at accounting for perception, perceptual knowledge, actions or practical
reasons has to take the relevant disjunctivist claims and arguments into consideration—
notably those discussed in the volume at hand.
The collection brings together seventeen specially written essays on disjunctivism in the
philosophy of mind, epistemology and, to a smaller extent, the philosophy of agency and
meta-ethics. The standard of the contributions is very high throughout and reflects the
quality of the respective discussions in the current literature. As its title already suggests,
the book is divided into three parts that are concerned with perception, action, and
knowledge, respectively. The relative prominence of disjunctivism in the related areas of
philosophy is reflected by the number of papers making up each part: there are eight
essays on the nature of perceptual experiences, six on perceptual knowledge or scepticism
about it, and only one on the nature of bodily action (with David-Hillel Ruben developing
a disjunctive account) and two on reasons for action (with Jennifer Hornsby defending,
and Jonathan Dancy attacking, a disjunctive treatment). Thus, all in all, fourteen of the
seventeen papers are concerned with issues in the philosophy of perception.
This is very much in line with the origin of disjunctivism in discussions of experi-
ence and its role in the acquisition of knowledge, as well as with the continuing focus
of the contemporary debates about disjunctivism on perception and perceptual
knowledge. Similarly, the essays in this volume reflect the fact that the two philosophers,
whose views figure most prominently in the various discussions, are John McDowell and
M. G. F. Martin (the latter being the main absentee among the contributors). But, as Adrian
Haddock and Fiona Macpherson’s introductory essay makes clear, Paul Snowdon’s work
deserves equal appreciation.
In his own contribution, Snowdon identifies J. M. Hinton’s writings (especially his
1973) as being unduly neglected, despite the widespread acknowledgement that Hinton
has been elemental in the early formulation and dissemination of disjunctivist ideas. More
specifically, Snowdon’s essay tries to get clearer about the precise role of Hinton’s writings
in the emergence of disjunctivism (as we now know it) as a philosophical position. During
his discussion, Snowdon questions the popular idea that Hinton actually invented
disjunctivism about perceptual experiences by pointing to the natural connection between
naive realism and disjunctivism (at least within a realist outlook on reality) and to the
tradition of naive realism prior to Hinton. Snowdon locates the specific importance of
Hinton’s work elsewhere, namely in drawing attention to the largely unsupported status
of the widespread (and not always explicit) assumption that perceptions, illusions and
hallucinations are of the same fundamental kind of experience; and in providing the first
detailed analysis of disjunctive statements (e.g., of the form ‘Macbeth perceives a dagger or
is having that illusion’, where ‘illusion’ is meant to include both misperception and
hallcuination). But, as Snowdon stresses, these disjunctive statements should not be
understood as descriptions of how things look to the subject concerned (e.g., as if there is a
dagger in front of him), but instead as picking out two exclusive kinds of experience.
Another important fact that Snowdon notes is that Hinton did not provide positive
arguments for disjunctivism about perceptual experiences, but argued only for the weaker
claim that the opposing common kind assumption just mentioned lacks support.
The other essays in the first part of the volume discuss the prospects of disjunctivism
about the nature of perceptual experiences. While William Fish and, to some extent, Bill
Brewer and Scott Sturgeon provide defences of this view, Byrne and Logue, E. J. Lowe, A. D.
Smith, Susanna Siegel and, incidentally, also Dancy in his paper on reasons for action argue
against it. Brewer, Sturgeon and Fish are, moreover, concerned with the issue of which
version of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is to be preferred. Brewer argues that
disjunctivism should treat experiences as instances of objectual awareness, rather than of
propositional awareness. Sturgeon and Fish, on the other hand, push more extreme
disjunctivist views which are similar in assuming (though for very different reasons) that
hallucinations are not mental states with a phenomenal character: although it may
introspectively seem to us so, there are no hallucinatory episodes as part of our stream of
consciousness. All these contributions are essential and worthwhile reading for philosophers
interested in the forms of disjunctivism concerned. But, for reasons of space, I am unable to
further discuss them here (apart from the essays by Siegel, Byrne and Logue, and Brewer).
In the remainder of this review article, I take a closer look at the introductory essay by
Haddock and Macpherson and, in particular, at their comments on the variety and unity of
disjunctivism. I also present one of Siegel’s challenges against Martin’s and Fish’s
disjunctivism about perceptual experiences, as well as some of the debates on perceptual
knowledge and the epistemic standing provided by perceptions, which discuss—and
sometimes misconstrue—relevant aspects of McDowell’s version of disjunctivism. Two
specific issues to be addressed are whether disjunctivists about experience should treat the
latter as representational or not, and whether—and if so, how—they might be able to
properly accommodate illusions. Both questions concern some of the core commitments of
disjunctivism, which have just recently begun to emerge as research topics in their own
right (cf. Travis 2004 and Fish 2009).
The introduction by Haddock and Macpherson is unusual in several respects. First, it is
very substantial and has the appearance of a full-blown contribution, not only in length
and detail, but also in argument. Second, it does not summarize the essays—this task is left
to an analytical table of contents containing abstracts of all essays—but instead provides a
detailed and systematic overview of the various forms of disjunctivism to be found in the
writings of Snowdon, McDowell and Martin, and briefly locates the particular
contributions to the volume at hand in the respective traditions. This turns the
introduction into a very useful background against which to read the subsequent essays.
I positively wish that more collections would follow this model of introducing their
contents, even if it meant more work for the editors concerned. Third, and perhaps most
noteworthy, the introduction addresses the important issue of whether the various kinds
of disjunctivism, put forward with respect to very different phenomena, might have
something distinctive in common. In fact, the question of unity arises very naturally from
the noticeable diversity of the collected essays that sometimes do not seem to share much
more than a very general concern with theories, which assume a difference in nature or
rationality where it has been orthodoxy to assume commonality. It is a bit unfortunate that
none of the other essays in the volume really takes up this issue—Byrne and Logue
perhaps come closest in their joint paper—and it can just be hoped that the question of
unity will figure more prominently in the future research on disjunctivist theories.
Haddock and Macpherson’s proposal is that ‘the mark of disjunctivism, in all of its
varieties, is a conception of the inner and the outer as suffused’ (p. 22). In the case of
metaphysical disjunctivism, what they mean by this is that disjunctivists reject the—often only
implicit—assumption of more orthodox views that the inner world and the outer world are
constitutively independent of each other. Different forms of metaphysical disjunctivism focus
thereby on different aspects of the inner and the outer. Haddock and Macpherson distinguish
three such forms. Metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences claims that some of
these inner experiences (i.e., perceptions) are constituted by objects in the outer world, while
others (i.e., hallucinations) are not.1 Its equivalent concerning external bodily movements
assumes that some of them (i.e., expressive actions) are constitued by internal elements (e.g.,
the underlying intentions or expressed mental states), while others (i.e., mere movements) are
not. And the corresponding theory of reasons for which, or because of which, we act—which may
reasonably be treated as part of the inner—maintains that some of them are constituted by
(known) outer facts, while others consist merely in (false) beliefs.
Furthermore, Haddock and Macpherson distinguish two forms of metaphysical
disjunctivism about perceptual experiences. Experiential disjunctivism—as developed in
Snowdon (1980, 1990)—is the more general form, since it just assumes a difference in
intrinsic nature between object-involving and object-less experiences. Phenomenal
disjunctivism, by contrast, is more specific about the difference in nature concerned: it is
a difference in phenomenal character, that is, in what the experiences are subjectively like.
Indeed, it may be argued that the nature of conscious experiences is exhausted by their
phenomenal character (or their ‘phenomenal nature’, as Martin (2010) puts it). But it may
also be argued that there is more to the nature of experiences than their first-personal
character—namely, for instance, their third-personal (e.g., causal, functional or informa-
tional) structure. In particular, there is the possibility of endorsing experiential
disjunctivism without endorsing phenomenal disjunctivism (but not the other way
round). Haddock and Macpherson briefly mention this possibility, but do not further
discuss the resulting structural disjunctivism about perceptual experiences.2
It is interesting to note that, although the essays in the collection at hand are by no
means untypical of the literature in (more or less) identifying disjunctivism with the claim
that perceptions and hallucinations do not share a ‘common element’ (see, for instance, the
contributions by Snowdon, Byrne and Logue, Ruben and Dancy), this claim need not be
endorsed by metaphysical disjunctivists (or by epistemological disjunctivists, for that
matter). For the assumption of a difference in nature between perceptions and
hallucinations is perfectly compatible with the idea that there is still some overlap in
the essential features of the two types of perceptual experience. This is also in line with
McDowell’s denial of an epistemological ‘highest common factor’, given that the latter is
just meant to stress that perceptions increase our epistemic standing more than
hallucinations and, hence, still leaves room for the possibility of their sameness in nature
(see below for more on this issue). What may explain the bias for the more extreme version
of metaphysical disjunctivism, according to which the two types of perceptual experience
have no essential feature in common, is perhaps that it has been dominating the recent
debate (partly because of its endorsement and defence by Martin (2004, 2006)). But it might
be worthwhile to consider alternative forms of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences
which, for instance, allow for (partial) identity in phenomenal or functional kind (cf.
Dorsch 2010, 2011).
What makes metaphysical disjunctivism interesting as a philosophical position is in
part what the two call the ‘fundamental disjunctivist commitment’ (p. 18): namely that
the constitutive differences in question are not recognizable from the subjective
perspective. For instance, disjunctivism about experiences claims that both veridical
and hallucinatory experiences can be truly described as cases of its phenomenally looking
to the subject concerned as if things are a certain way (e.g., as if there is a red rose);
while they none the less differ in nature and, possibly, even in character. So what
experiential disjunctivism questions is the justification of the inference from the subjective
indistinguishability of two experiences to their sameness in nature. The possibility of a gap
arises here because the presence or absence of a contribution of external objects to the
constitution of experiences is not noticeable from the inside. Similar considerations are
true of other forms of metapysical disjunctivism, such as those concerning bodily
movements or reasons for action.
In contrast to metaphyscial disjunctivism which makes a claim about the nature of
things, epistemological disjunctivism is concerned with the epistemic standing of the subject.
Haddock and Macpherson identify two forms of epistemological disjunctivism. The first
focuses again on perceptual experiences and maintains that, while perceptions do have the
power to justify beliefs and make knowledge available for us, hallucinations do not (even
if they happen to be veridical). The underlying thought is that a two-factor theory of
knowledge—which treats justification as defeasible and therefore as independent from
whether the experiences in question correspond to the facts—should be rejected in favour
of the view that experiential justification has to be indefeasible and therefore involve
factive experiences (cf. McDowell 1982). The second form of epistemological disjunctivism
is concerned with bodily movements and maintains that only some of them—namely the
expressive ones—give us access to the person’s mind. More specifically, seeing expressive
behaviour does put us in the position to acquire knowledge about the expressed states of
mind, while seeing other bodily movements does not. Again, the underlying idea is that
expressive behaviour is an indefeasible indicator of the presence of the expressed state of
mind, but non-expressive behaviour is not.
also observe that epistemological disjunctivism has so far played no role in the debate
about reasons for action, although the view that only the recognition of reason-constituting
facts can ground knowledge of what to do (or believe, for that matter) surely has its
attractions. Finally, they suggest that epistemological disjunctivism is of the same type of
view as its metaphysical counterpart, since it posits the same suffusion of the inner and the
outer. More precisely, Haddock and Macpherson understand epistemological disjuncti-
vism as maintaining that justification rests on a link of indefeasible indication (rather than
a relation of constitutive dependence) between aspects of the two realms. Inner
perceptions are indicators of the existence of outer objects or facts; and outer expressive
behaviour is indicative of inner mental states.3
However, this is not enough to unify metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism
under the label of ‘suffusion’. What is still missing is an identification of what constitution
and indication may have in common. Moreover, the focus on the relation between
expressive behaviour and expressed state of mind only distracts from the distinctive
feature of all forms of epistemological discjunctivism. For what ultimately matters is that
the epistemic standing bestowed by inner experiences is said to be constitutively
dependent on outer facts: we are justified in judgementally assuming the presence of a
tree, or the sadness of a person, only if the relevant perceptual experience is a perception
and, hence, corresponds to the facts. By contrast, whether the facts at issue are directly
perceivable, or instead perceptually knowable merely in virtue of being indicated by
perceivable facts, is relevant only for the determination of the scope of the justification
provided by the experiences concerned; it does not contribute to the quality of the
epistemic standing of the subject.
This shift of attention back from bodily movements to perceptual experiences makes it
possible to provide a general and basic characterization of disjunctivist positions as views
that defend a relation of constitutive dependence between some inner and some outer
elements.4 But it also has the consequence that the two forms of epistemological
disjunctivism identified by Haddock and Macpherson are, in fact, just one and the same:
they both concern the epistemic standing bestowed by perceptual experiences and its
dependence on external facts.
Indeed, it may seem reasonable to go one step further and maintain that epistemo-
logical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is really nothing more than another
form of metaphysical disjunctivism—namely one that is concerned with the power of
perceptual experiences to determine the epistemic standing of the subject, and which takes
this power to be part of the intrinsic nature of the experiences. According to this view,
experiences are factive, or constituted by external elements, in so far as their essential
reason-giving power is constitutively dependent on those elements. What renders the
resulting metaphysical disjunctivism about the rational role of experiences particularly
interesting is that it is compatible with the idea that perceptions and hallucinations still
share their phenomenal character and functional role (cf. Dorsch 2010, 2011). Moreover,
disjunctivism about reasons for action—or, indeed, good actions5—may be integrated in a
very similar way: having reason to act—or acting in a good way—is constitutively
dependent on external facts. So, perhaps what is really distinctive of disjunctivist positions
is that they defend the existence of certain phenomena—whether they are experiences,
actions, reasons or something else—the intrinsic nature of which contains both inner and
outer elements, that is, mind and world.
In her contribution, Siegel provides several objections against the epistemic conception
of hallucinations, which is central to the versions of phenomenal disjunctivism about
perceptual experiences defended by Martin and Fish. One of her challenges is to provide
As Haddock and Macpherson note, metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism are
logically independent views: someone may endorse one of them, but not the other. They
an explanation of the fact that we are in a position to introspectively know of our—
perceptual or hallucinatory—experiences of something that they are not perceptions of
something else. To take one of Siegel’s examples, it is possible for us to come to know by
introspection alone that our perceptual experience of a butterfly is not a perception of a
sausage. She argues that proponents of the epistemic conception do not have the resources
to account for this fact about what is knowable for us. In particular, this epistemic fact
cannot be explained by reference to the introspective indistinguishability of hallucinations
from corresponding perceptions. Siegel’s reason for this conclusion is that being unable to
introspectively know that our experience is, say, not a perception of a butterfly seems to
leave it epistemically open whether it is a perception of a butterfly or a perception of
something else (e.g., a sausage).
But this line of reasoning is problematic in two respects. First, it is not sensitive to the
fact that proponents of disjunctivism and of the epistemic conception would assume that
what is in need of explanation are in fact two distinct types of introspective knowledge,
which have different kinds of experience as their object and, hence, different facts as their
grounds. And second, both the relationality of perceptions and the introspective
indistinguishability of hallucinations—that is, the distinct grounds in the two different
cases of perceptual experience—exclude the epistemic possibility of, say, perceiving a
sausage when having an experience which is introspectively indistinguishable from a
perception of a butterfly.
To be more specific on this last point, we are in a position to introspectively know of our
perceptions of a butterfly that they are not perceptions of a sausage precisely because being
acquainted with a butterfly (i.e., enjoying genuinely relational awareness of the latter)
rules out the epistemic—as well as the metaphysical—possibility of being acquainted with
a sausage. We are presented with an existing butterfly located before our eyes; and this
relational presentation does not leave it epistemically open that our object of perception
may in fact be a sausage. To use Austin’s phrase, it is already ‘settled’ by our experience
that the perceived object is a butterfly (cf. Austin 1962: 113).
According to phenomenal disjunctivism, the same considerations cannot apply to the case
of hallucinations, given that the latter are not instances of acquaintance. What matters for them
is, instead, the fact that they are introspectively indistinguishable for us from the
corresponding perceptions. More specifically, the fact that we cannot introspectively know
a hallucination of a butterfly to be distinct from a perception of a butterfly entails that we can
distinguish the hallucination from a perception of a sausage. For the reason just mentioned,
we can tell apart a perception of a butterfly from a perception of a sausage. Hence, any
hallucination, which we cannot distinguish from a perception of a sausage, would turn out to
be discriminable from a perception of a butterfly in this respect—namely relative to whether
it is distinguishable from a perception of a sausage. For instance, the hallucination would fail
to incline (and entitle) us to judge that we are not perceiving a sausage; and we would be able
to note this difference between the hallucination and a perception of a butterfly by
introspection alone. That the introspectively accessible indistinguishability of a hallucination
of a butterfly from a perception of a butterfly entails the introspective knowability of its
distinctness from a perception of a sausage suffices to ensure that the knowability is
grounded in the indistinguishability.6
The essays in the last part of the volume are primarily concerned with the significance
of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences for two important and closely related
epistemological issues: the nature of perceptual justification and knowledge, and the
possibility of answering scepticism about our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
Alan Millar concentrates on one particular motivation for experiential disjunctivism,
namely that it can well explain our capacity to perceptually pick out objects (and,
subsequently, think demonstratively about them) and our capacity to perceptually acquire
knowledge about them. His general strategy is to show that experiential disjunctivism is
not needed to account for these two aspects of our perceptual contact with external objects.
More specifically, while Millar grants that the two capacities can be accounted for only by
reference to essentially object-dependent elements, he maintains that taking these elements
to be the perceptions themselves is only one way of guaranteeing the needed relationality.
The other way, put forward by Millar, is to identify the underlying discriminative and
recognitional abilities, the exercise of which becomes manifest in the occurrence of
perceptions, as the object-dependent elements. Accordingly, only perceptions—but not
hallucinations—involve the employment of those abilities.
This attempt to be disjunctivist about perceptual abilities, rather than perceptual
experiences, is certainly subject to the objections raised by proponents of phenomenal
disjunctivism against their opponents (cf. Martin 2002, 2004, 2006 and Fish 2009). But there
is also a more direct worry about Millar’s specific view of the perceptual abilities at play.
He understands them in such a way that the presence of a sufficient number of perfect
replicas undermines our possession of those abilities. That is, if we are in an environment
with many fake azaleas that are visually indistinguishable from real ones, we loose both
the ability to discriminate azaleas from other flowers and the ability to recognize them for
what they are, namely azaleas. However, disjunctivists about perceptual experiences are
likely to dispute that the issue of whether we enjoy an experience of seeing a particular
azalea depends in such a way on what is true of our environment (or, relatedly, in relevant
close worlds). After all, the only thing that matters for metaphysical disjunctivists is
whether the experience concerned involves a particular azalea as its constituent; while
epistemological disjunctivists tend to insist on the indefeasible character of the epistemic
justification provided by perceptions in virtue of their relation to the perceived objects. The
worry is therefore that Millar’s account does not manage to capture the particularity of
perception: the proposed perceptual abilities remain too general in nature.
In their contributions, John McDowell and Crispin Wright continue their past
discussions about the relevance of epistemological disjunctivism for scepticism. One of
the sceptical thoughts at issue—and, according to McDowell, central to Cartesian
scepticism—is that it is impossible to make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access
to external and experience-independent facts. That is—since what is at issue is the
intelligibility of epistemological disjunctivism—it is denied that the epistemic standing
bestowed on us by perceptions is any better than the epistemic standing bestowed on us
by hallucinations. But if the best epistemic standing available to us is that provided by
hallucinations, we cannot rule out standard sceptical scenarios.
Another part of the debate between McDowell and Wright is whether the introduced
sceptical thought is indeed central to Cartesian scepticism, and also whether epistemo-
logical disjunctivism has any significant bearings on Humean, or Moorean, forms of
scepticism. Ram Neta in his contribution sides with McDowell on the latter issue and
provides a contextualist defence of McDowell’s approach against Wright’s objections.
Duncan Pritchard is more critical about certain elements in McDowell’s reply to
scepticism—notably his quietist stance. But he nonetheless defends (if not fully endorses)
the general neo-Moorean strategy to be extracted from McDowell’s reply, including the
idea of internally accessable reasons that are constituted by external facts.
In what follows, I concentrate on the exchange between McDowell and Wright on the
initial sceptical thought, according to which it is impossible to make sense of the idea that
perceptions increase our epistemic standing more than hallucinations. McDowell’s
response to this challenge consists basically of two claims. First, he argues that the
intelligibility of this idea is already ensured by the intelligibility of the idea that, in
perceptual experience, it at least appears to us as if the objective world is a certain way.
And second, he maintains that the sceptical position presupposes the intelligibility of
understanding experiences as appearances as of an objective world, precisely because its
denial of the intelligibility of the idea that such appearances can put us into contact with
reality rests on the assumption (of the intelligibility of the idea) that enjoying such
appearances is compatible with reality not being as it seems to be.
Wright’s criticism of McDowell’s response exploits the fact—acknowledged by the
latter—that hallucinations and dream states, which are subjectively indistinguishable from
perceptions, are appearances as of an objective world, too, despite not making us directly
aware of the latter. Because of this fact, so Wright, understanding experiences as
appearances as of reality does not suffice for understanding them as being able to bring us
into indefeasible contact with reality. However, Wright seems to miss McDowell’s point
here. What Wright’s example shows is that being an appearance as of the objective world
does not suffice for making us directly and indefeasibly aware of that world; and that,
relatedly, thinking of an experience as purporting to be about reality does not imply
thinking of it as an instance of direct awareness of reality. But McDowell can—and
probably will—accept both conclusions. What he is instead concerned with is establishing
a weaker claim, namely that conceiving of an experience as being an appearance as of the
objective world implies being able to conceive of it as an instance of direct awareness.
Perhaps there is an underlying—and implicit—disagreement about what it means for a
perceptual experience to be an appearance as of reality. McDowell assumes this to mean
that they purport to put us into direct contact to reality—that is, that they purport to
improve our epistemic standing with respect to how the objective world is. Spoken more
loosely, that hallucinations (as well as perceptions) purport to be of the objective world
means that they purport to be perceptions, and not hallucinations—whereby the difference
between these two types of perceptual experience is to be understood in epistemic terms.
Accordingly, thinking of experiences as appearances as of reality implies thinking of them
as purporting to be instances of direct awareness, which again implies being able to
conceive of them as such instances. But someone—like Wright—who is less sympathetic to
epistemological disjunctivism might perhaps want to deny this priority of perceptions
over hallucinations and insist that experiences, which purport to be of objective reality, are
neutral on whether they are perceptions (rather than hallucinations).
McDowell’s version of disjunctivism is also the subject of a dispute between Bill Brewer
and Sonia Sedivy. Brewer argues that proponents of this form of disjunctivism should
understand successful perception as a matter of being relationally aware of an object,
rather than as a matter of correctly representing a fact. Part of his reasons for this
conclusion is the ubiquity of illusions. For Brewer, it is very plausible to assume that all
perceptual experiences are illusory in at least some—possibly rather minor—respect. But
this means that a disjunctivist should count illusions among the good cases, that is, cases
which involve genuine contact with reality. For, otherwise, he has to accept that there are
no good cases of perceptual experience, and that the nature and functional role of the bad
cases has to be elucidated in terms of some never achieved ideal of perception. However,
as Brewer argues, the disjunctivist can treat illusions as good cases only if he understands
them as instances of successful object awareness, rather than as instances of unsuccessful
(i.e., false) representational awareness.
Sedivy, by contrast, stresses the importance of object-depending concepts—concepts
which may be employed in thought only if their putative referents do exist—in
McDowell’s and Gareth Evans’ writings. Accordingly, treating illusions as conceptual
representations is compatible with treating them as successful in their reference to the
objective world. That is, a disjunctivist like McDowell may insist that illusions—just like
perceptions, but unlike hallucinations—succeed in putting us into contact with external
objects, even though they misrepresent how those objects really are. However, as Byrne
and Logue note in their essay, this is probably not a route that McDowell would be
prepared to take, given that he counts illusions among the bad cases elsewhere (cf.
McDowell 1982). Another option for him would be to insist that broadly illusory
experiences may still be locally veridical. That is, while it may very well be true that all
perceptual experiences misrepresent the world in some respects, this does not prevent
them from getting it right in others. This is possible because of the richness of experience: a
single perceptual experience may—and usually does—present us with many distinct
putative facts. Finally, McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism need not concern itself
with the ubiquity or not of illusions. Its primary purpose is to show how perceptual
knowledge is possible, and not whether it is actual. Moreover, since it need not be
combined with experiential disjunctivism, the issue of spelling out the nature of illusions in
terms of perceptions does not necessarily arise.
So, what may partly (though by no means fully) explain the disagreement between
Brewer and McDowell is that the former appears to take the latter to be an experiential
disjunctivist, and not merely an epistemological one. This metaphysical understanding of
McDowell’s view is not uncommon. Byrne and Logue identify a list of philosophers
who appear to construe his position in this way (p. 65, n.15); and Sturgeon offers two
rival interpretations of McDowell’s writings, both of which seem to treat him as endorsing
experiential disjunctivism. In this context, it is very helpful that Byrne and Logue
take a close look at the actual textual evidence and come to the conclusion that this
widespread metaphysical reading of McDowell’s position is in fact not very well
supported by his key writings.
Byrne and Logue also use the example of illusions to argue against experiential—
including phenomenal—disjunctivism. What they do is present some sort of dilemma. Its
first horn is that, if a disjunctivist counts illusions among the bad cases, he is forced to
deny that they share a common element with perceptions. But, as Byrne and Logue point
out, there is such a shared element between comparable perceptions and illusions, namely
that, in both, some particular object looks to be a certain way. Their crucial assumption is
that there is no reason to doubt that our ordinary statements about ‘how things look’—
possibly in contrast with more technical statements about ‘visual experiences’—pick out
mental states. However, as they concede, this assumption depends partly on success in
rebutting the disjunctivist’s arguments in favour of his position. Besides, there is also the
problem with the ubiquity of illusions (see above). And Byrne and Logue’s line of
reasoning does not seem to have a bearing on forms of metaphysical disjunctivism that
allow for some overlap in the natures of perceptions and illusions—for instance, a shared
content which is described by look statements of the kind mentioned.
not seem to be any good reason to deny hallucinations the same general content, once it is
accepted for perceptions and hallucinations, there is a common element among all types of
perceptual experience. However, the experiential disjunctivist has, again, several replies
available to him. Following Brewer, he may insist that the difference between veridical and
illusory good cases is best captured in terms of objectual awareness. Then, he can reject the
claim that perceptions involve any general content—either by arguing that they do not
involve any content at all, or by pointing out that perceptual content (in contrast to the
content of illusions) is through and through object-dependent and, hence, particular. A
variant of both replies would be to insist that what constitutes perceptions—or,
alternatively, the object-dependent elements involved in perceptual content—are not
mere objects, but property instances. Finally, Byrne and Logue’s consideration again do
not concern forms of metaphysical disjunctivism that posit only a partial difference in
essence between perceptions and hallucinations.
What the essays in this collection reveal is that disjunctivist views come in a large
variety, are highly relevant for a wide range of philosophical issues and may both enrich
and clarify the respective debates. They also illustrate that disjunctivism is a difficult and
challenging view, perhaps more so than many of its rivals. But this should be no excuse for
philosophers working on one of the topics covered by the essays in this volume to
disregard the respective disjunctivist proposals. Engagement with Haddock and
Macpherson’s collection is indeed an ideal way of getting acquainted with the
contemporary state of the discussion of disjunctivism and its application to various
problems in theoretical and practical philosophy.
Fabian Dorsch
Institut Jean-Nicod
Ecole Normale Supe´rieure
Paris
France
fabian.dorsch@uclmail.net
The second horn of the dilemma for the experiential disjunctivist is to treat illusions as 
good cases, which share some essential element with perceptions. Byrne and Logue 
identify representational content as the best candidate for that element. Their idea is that 
illusions differ from perceptions just in the correctness of how they present a given object 
as being; and that this idea of a difference in correctness makes sense only in the context of 
an assumed representationality. Now, their argument continues that at least part of the 
shared content should be understood in general terms (i.e., as having a logical form 
involving existential quantification, rather than singular terms). And, given that there 
4 Metaphysical disjunctivism about bodily movements stands out because it is the
only form of disjunctivism mentioned which takes the outer to be constituted by the inner,
rather than vice versa.
5 For instance, if good and bad actions are taken to differ in whether they are
constitutively dependent on the presence of reasons for action.
6 It is interesting to note that Siegel, too, argues that proponents of the epistemic
conception should endorse this entailment (pp. 218ff.), but does not take this to be
sufficient for grounding the availability of the introspective knowledge under considera-
tion (pp. 219ff.).
NOTES
1 The issue where to locate illusions is to be discussed further below. In the
terminology which I use here, the class of ‘perceptual experiences’ is made up by three
distinct types of experience: ‘perceptions’ (i.e., the clearly good cases), ‘illusions’ and
‘hallucinations’ (i.e., the clearly bad cases). Besides, illusions and hallucinations are
generally assumed to be ‘perfect’, or perception-like, in the sense that they are subjectively
indistinguishable from perceptions.
2 See Dorsch (2010, 2011) for a defence of such a view. There, I also spell out why I
prefer to use the label ‘experiential disjunctivism’ to denote metaphysical disjunctivism
about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences (what Haddock and
Macpherson call ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’, rather than metaphysical disjunctivism
about perceptual experiences more generally (what they call ‘experiential disjunctivism’).
In this review of their collection, I stick to Haddock’s and Macpherson’s terminology.
3 While the terminology of ‘indication’ is entirely mine, it is meant to capture what
Haddock and Macpherson (following McDowell) have in mind: something indicates
something else just in case it provides us with indefeasible evidence for the latter.
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